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8 DAVID LOWERY, et al.,
9 Plaintiffs,

10 v.
11 RHAPSODY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
12 Defendant.
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14 Case No. [16-cv-01135-JSW](#)
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**16 ORDER REGARDING RHAPSODY'S
17 EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY
18 ENFORCEMENTS OF ATTORNEYS'
19 FEES AWARD WITHOUT BOND**

20 Re: Dkt. No. 277
21

22 Now before the Court for consideration is the motion by Defendant Rhapsody
23 International, Inc. ("Defendant") to stay enforcement of the Court's judgment regarding attorneys'
24 fees and costs award pending appeal without the need to post a bond. The Court has considered
25 the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case. The Court finds the
26 motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
27 **HEREBY GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART** Defendant's motion.

28 BACKGROUND

29 On January 4, 2022, this Court issued an order setting out an award of attorneys' fees and
30 costs in the amount of \$1,720,441.57.

31 On January 20, 2022, Defendant filed an emergency motion to stay enforcement of the
32 attorneys' fees award for 90 days without the posting of a bond. Defendant contends that it cannot
33 afford to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of 125% of the award but within 60-90 days will

1 be in a better financial position to do so.

2 The Court shall address other relevant facts in the remainder of this order.

3 ANALYSIS

4 A. Applicable Legal Standard.

5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) requires that a party appealing a monetary judgment
6 obtain a supersedeas bond in order to obtain a stay on appeal. *See Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark*
7 *Cty.*, 497 F.3d 902, 913 (9th Cir. 2007); *see also Van v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, No. 08-cv-5296-
8 PSG, 2015 WL 2345586, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2015) (“The plain language of Rule 62(d)
9 requires that a bond be posted to stay a judgment pending appeal . . .”). This requirement is
10 designed to protect appellees “from the risk of a later uncollectible judgment and compensate
11 [them] for delay in the entry of the final judgment.” *N.L.R.B. v. Westphal*, 859 F.2d 818, 819 (9th
12 Cir. 1988). In general, a bond under Rule 62(d) should be sufficient to pay the judgment plus
13 interest, costs, and any other relief that the appellate court may award. *See Cotton ex rel. McClure*
14 *v. City of Eureka*, 860 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

15 District courts, however, have inherent authority in setting supersedeas bonds. *Rachel v.*
16 *Banana Republic, Inc.*, 831 F.3d 1503, 1505 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). This discretion includes the
17 authority to set the amount of the bond, to permit an alternative form of security, or to waive the
18 bond requirement. *See, e.g., Cotton*, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1027. To determine whether to waive
19 Rule 62(d)’s bond requirement, courts apply the following factors:

20 (1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time
21 required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the
22 degree of confidence that the district court has in the availability of
23 funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the defendant’s ability to pay
24 the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of
25 money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial
26 situation that the requirement to post a bond would place creditors of
27 the defendant in an insecure position.

28 *Dillon v. City of Chicago*, 866 F.2d 902, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1988) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); *see also Kranson v. Fed. Express Corp.*, No. 11-cv-05826-YGR, 2013 WL
6872495, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2013) (“Courts in the Ninth Circuit regularly use the *Dillon*
factors in determining whether to waive the bond requirement.”); *United States v. Moyer*, No. 07-

1 cv-0510-SBA, 2008 WL 3478063, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008) (noting that “courts often
2 consider what are known as the *Dillon* factors” and citing cases). Ultimately, the appellant has a
3 burden to “‘objectively demonstrate’ the reasons for departing from the usual requirement of a full
4 supersedeas bond.” *Cotton*, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1028.

5 **B. The Court Declines to Waive Rule 62(d)’s Bond Requirement Entirely.**

6 The Court finds that Defendant has failed to objectively demonstrate sufficient reasons to
7 have the Court depart from Rule 62(d)’s bond requirement in its entirety. In its discretion, the
8 Court instead finds that a reduced bond amount would be sufficient to ensure payment and fairness
9 to both parties.

10 Defendant’s own arguments in support of the motion work against the company for
11 purposes of the third and fourth *Dillon* factors. Defendant argues that the Court should waive
12 Rule 62(d)’s bond requirement because requiring Defendant to secure a supersedeas bond as a
13 condition of a stay would place an undue financial hardship on the company. This argument,
14 almost by necessity, means that Defendant’s ability to pay the final judgment is not so plain as to
15 make a bond a waste of money. It also directly undermines the Court’s confidence in Defendant’s
16 ultimate ability to pay the judgment.

17 Defendant nonetheless argues that the Court should waive Rule 62(d)’s bond requirement
18 precisely because of the financial hardship such a requirement would place on the company. The
19 Court is not entirely persuaded. The very purpose of the bond requirement is to protect the
20 appellee’s ability to eventually collect on the judgment. *See Westphal*, 859 F.2d at 819. Given
21 that Defendant asserts that the judgment in this case presents an extreme financial burden, the
22 Court believes a bond is necessary to protect Plaintiff’s interest in eventual collection of the
23 judgment. *See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc.*, No. 11-cv-3838-ODW, 2013 WL
24 361109, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (“The fact that Inhale ‘does not have sufficient liquid
25 assets’ to cover the award of attorneys’ fees and costs is precisely why it must post a supersedeas
26 bond.”); *Sarver v. The Hurt Locker LLC*, No. 10-cv-09034-JHN, 2012 WL 12892147, at *3 (C.D.
27 Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) (“The Court is sympathetic to the financial hardship to Plaintiff. However, the
28 Court cannot place Defendants’ statutory right to recovery at risk solely on the basis of Plaintiff’s

1 ability to pay.”); *Lewis v. United Joint Venture*, No. 07-cv-639, 2009 WL 1654600, at *1 (W.D.
2 Mich. June 10, 2009) (“UJV’s alleged illiquidity strengthens, not weakens, the need for an
3 appropriate bond.”).

4 The Court acknowledges that there may be cases in which requiring an appellant to post a
5 supersedeas bond as a condition of a stay may pose such an undue financial burden. *See, e.g.*,
6 *Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.*, 881 F.2d 788, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1989), *vacated on reh’g on*
7 *other grounds in* 929 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he most common justification for allowing
8 alternatives to a supersedeas bond is the financial hardship that the bond may impose on
9 appellants . . .”); *see also Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co., Inc. v. Bache Halsey Stuart,*
10 *Inc.*, 600 F.2d 1189, 1189 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[I]f the judgment debtor’s present financial condition
11 is such that the posting of a full bond would impose an undue financial burden, the court similarly
12 is free to exercise a discretion to fashion some other arrangement . . . which would furnish equal
13 protection to the judgment creditor.”). Defendant, however, has not demonstrated that requiring
14 the company to secure a supersedeas bond of a lesser amount would constitute such an undue
15 burden.

16 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has not met their burden of demonstrating a
17 reason to deviate from Rule 62(d)’s bond requirement in its entirety.

18 **C. The Amount of the Bond.**

19 Traditionally, courts have required that appellants supply a supersedeas bond in the amount
20 of 1.25 and 1.5 times the judgment. *See Cotton*, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. The Court finds there is
21 no reason to require a bond at the high end of the range, and given Defendant’s representations
22 about its current financial situation, the Court, in its discretion, sets the amount of the bond at half
23 of the amount owed. Accordingly, the Court will require Defendant to submit a supersedeas bond
24 in the amount of \$860,220.00 which is .5 times the amount of the judgment in the amount of
25 \$1,720,441.57.

26 **CONCLUSION**

27 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to stay enforcement of the judgment,
28 without bond, pending appeal is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. If Defendant

1 wishes to stay enforcement of the monetary judgment in this action pending appeal, they shall post
2 a supersedeas bond in the amount of \$860,220.00 by Thursday, February 3, 2022.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 28, 2022

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
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A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jeffrey S. White", is written over a solid horizontal line. Below the line, the name "JEFFREY S. WHITE" is printed in a standard sans-serif font, followed by "United States District Judge" in a smaller font.